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A B S T R A C T
Infrastructure systems underpin our modern communities, providing a platform for social and economic growth.
Increasing urbanisation coupled with an increasing population means that these systems are continually ex-
panding, becoming increasingly complex and interconnected. Therefore, a single infrastructure system now
relies on other systems to maintain normal functionality. Whilst analysis methods exist to determine the impact
of failures in single infrastructure systems, methods to analyse the impact of interdependence of infrastructure
systems can be found lacking. Percolation theory is often used to assess failures in one system due to an initial
failure in another connected systems. However, whilst this method has many mathematical applications, we
show that it can give erroneous results when applied to model failure in infrastructure systems. In this paper, we
propose a new method for the analysis of interdependent infrastructure systems which also accounts for their
hierarchical structure.
1. Introduction
Infrastructure has been defined in many different terms; its societal
role [29], its role underpinning economic well-being [23] and its ca-
pital intensity and public (or quasi-public) nature [39]. Essentially in-
frastructure transmits something, whether physical goods, energy or
information, from a place where it is available (either manufactured,
generated or stored) to a place where it is needed. This ``infrastructure”
becomes ``critical infrastructure” when its failure would have severe
economic or social consequences [2, 8].
The failure of these critical infrastructure systems can have wide
reaching and long lasting effects, not only to the systems that were
initially damaged but also to their dependent systems. The 2005
Cumbrian (UK) storms are good example of this. The storms flooded
many critical infrastructure assets, including: 15 electricity substations,
three water treatment works, five wastewater treatment works three
railway lines, four major road links, three police stations, a fire station
and Carlisle Civic Centre [12, 15, 24, 28]. Strong winds also blocked
roads with debris, damaged structures (including one water treatment
works) and caused around 1440 faults in the electricity distribution
network [12, 24]. The effect of these infrastructures failures was am-
plified by cascading failures in networks which depended upon them.
For example, from the water company's perspective, 23 potable water
and up to 41 wastewater facilities lost power [24, 28]. The inspection
and recovery of sites was hampered by damage to access routes, with
some wastewater sites being inaccessible for over 72 h. In some cases,
police assistance was needed to deliver emergency generators to a key
wastewater treatment works site [28]. Meanwhile the public switched
telephone network failed and the batteries sustaining the mobile tele-
phone transmitters were depleted, not only hampering communications
but also causing pump failures as telemetry signals were lost [24, 28].
In this event, the water and wastewater networks performed well given
the severity; only four of the water facility failures caused a loss of
supply to customers [24, 28]. Notwithstanding, this event and sub-
sequent events in Gloucestershire and Yorkshire [7] raised concerns by
infrastructure owners and operators within the UK regarding their
ability to assess, anticipate and avoid these risks. This concern is echoed
internationally, driven by critical infrastructure failures such as those in
Italy [34], Germany [27] and North America [38], to name but a few.
Investment in more resilient infrastructure is broadly supported,
with the UK Government planning in December 2016 to invest £500
billion in infrastructure, with £300 billion of this to be invested by
2020/21 [22]. Indeed, investment in infrastructure is an attractive
Keynesian response by policy makers in response to a recession, as
evidenced by the infrastructure provisions in the 2009 American Re-
covery and Reinvestment Act [26]. However, especially in austere
times, there is a counteracting pressure to limit the burden on taxpayers
and bill-paying customers. Therefore risks due to dependencies between
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infrastructure systems are more than an academic or macro-political
concern; infrastructure providers need to demonstrate, firstly, that in-
vestment in resilience is justified and secondly that the limited re-
sources are being deployed cost-effectively.
To be able to achieve this, infrastructure providers and operators
require modelling approaches to assess critical infrastructure failures
and determine the impact that third party failures (i.e. failures within a
connected system) may have to their system. In this paper, we provide a
brief overview of the modelling methodologies available to infra-
structure providers to model the failures in their system due to a third
party failure, showing that the commonly used percolation theory ap-
proach is potentially deficient for modelling cascading failures within
infrastructure systems and finally develop a new approach to model
interdependent cascading failures. In this paper we concentrate solely
on the consequence aspect of risk equation. It is beyond the scope of
this paper, but studies (e.g. Hernandez-Fajardo and Duenas-Osorio
[41]; Kong et al. [42]) have demonstrated that models of consequences
can be neatly coupled to failure probability models to generate a full
risk assessment. It is worth nothing that in this paper a full risk as-
sessment of individual assets and systems is outside the scope of ana-
lysis. We do not consider the probability component of risk, but focus
on the criticality and impact elements.
2. Existing techniques for modelling risk
Multiple methodologies have been developed and proposed for
modelling the interdependencies, or dependencies, within infra-
structure systems. The range of methods developed reflects the different
requirements of multiple stakeholders involved in critical infrastructure
protection. Haimes [18] noted that ``models are built to answer specific
questions” and it follows that the models reflect the specific questions
posed by specific people. Due to critical infrastructure's national im-
portance these questions have typically been asked by governments and
the methods proposed reflect their broad priorities.
These developed methodologies include: systems dynamics models
which provide a logical approach for analysing interdependent infra-
structure given its focus upon dependencies and feedbacks between
interacting components of complex systems [6] and agent-based mod-
elling in which the actions of ``agents” (e.g. people, vehicles) are de-
fined by a given set of rules. Agent-based modelling has previously been
applied to simulate infrastructure interdependencies. In this approach
system components - be they people, facilities or whole networks - are
represented as interacting agents ([10],31]). Other studies have used
variations of input-output modelling to explore the cascading effects of
failures between sectors, examples include: Haimes et al. [19], Setolla
et al. [37] and Hallengate [20]. The reader is directed to Pederson et al.
[33], Eusgeld et al. [16], Ouyang [32], Hickford et al. [21] and Iturriza
et al. [25] for a more detailed review of these, and other, modelling
approaches. All of these approaches have many strengths, particularly
the inclusion of time and duration of the crises, which are very im-
portant in relation to the magnitude of the effect and the associated
impacts. However, they also typically aggregate whole infrastructure
sectors into homogenous entities and therefore offer little to the prac-
titioner seeking to enhance the resilience of a specific system.
Traditionally, physically based models, sometimes referred to as
deterministic, comprehensive or process-based models, have been em-
ployed to model the physical processes displayed by these real-world
systems (e.g. the flow of electricity around a power grid). For a detailed
explanation of these physically based models the reader is directed to
Sallam and Malik [35] and Novak et al. [30]. These models can give a
good representation of specifically modelled case studies, for example,
assessing the proportion of consumers without a supply of resource
after the failure of specific infrastructure components or assessing the
extent that a contaminant will travel through the system. However, in
terms of assessing interdependence, or dependence, the realism of flow
based models is counterbalanced by their complexity, since their data
requirements, computational costs and general tractability make them
difficult to apply in real-world systems. The former problem is perhaps
the most significant. Data to support models, particularly those asses-
sing cross sector risks, is frequently spread across multiple data sets and
access is often limited by concerns about both competitive advantage
and security [33]. Therefore, assessing risk in one system due to third
party failures can be a very difficult task; for example, a water company
will have access to all the data on their system however, data regarding
other infrastructure systems on which they depend will be difficult to
obtain. Whilst the structures and governance for data sharing nominally
exist there remain significant obstacles, particularly regarding the
compatibility of systems and concerns about security. Some assump-
tions can be made in the modelling approach to account for the lack of
data in certain areas, however, these assumptions may reduce the
realism of the model and the accuracy of the outputs. These models can
also be found lacking when assessing the resilience of the system, as
they are only suitable for providing this information for chosen sce-
narios, potentially leaving communities vulnerable to unforeseen
events. Therefore, for infrastructure providers to improve the resilience
of the infrastructure on which we all depend, we need more accurate,
yet still efficient, methods to target investment to achieve maximum
benefit.
One of the emerging modelling techniques to assess the inherent
hazard tolerance of infrastructure systems, either singly or inter-
dependent systems, is network graph theory. This technique is arguably
the most computationally efficient, as it is only concerned with mod-
elling the topology of the system and capturing the interaction between
different elements (whether these represent power stations, reservoirs
providing a supply of resource or homes demanding a quantity of re-
source). Using this methodology it has been shown that many infra-
structure systems form different patterns of network connectivity or
network architectures [13], with most being classified as either ``scale-
free” [3] or ``exponential” [40]. Classifying networks into a network
class is beneficial as it allows for an insight into their inherent hazard
tolerance without the need for complex analysis [14]. For example,
networks classed as ``scale-free” include a large number of weakly
connected components (with a few connections to others) and a very
small number of highly connected components. It has, therefore, been
shown that scale-free networks are vulnerable to targeted attack, as
these will tend to remove the highly connected components, and re-
silient to random hazard, which will tend to remove one of the weakly
connected components (assuming all components have an equal chance
of being affected) [1]. Methodologies also exist for analysing the in-
terdependent cascading failures between infrastructure systems. One of
the most noted techniques in this area is percolation theory [17], which
models the propagation of node, or link, failures throughout two in-
terconnected systems. This technique requires only the topology of all
interconnected systems to be modelled and does not require complex
information, which is usually very difficult to obtain, about multiple
systems. However, whilst network theory is a useful tool at gaining an
understanding of the hazard tolerance of a system it is not infallible.
The omission of a ``flow” element, and capacity, means that these
models do not capture the true vulnerability of a system [32]. In a water
network, for example, gravity and frictional losses as well as network
connectivity determine whether a demand can be met so a purely to-
pological network may underestimate the risk. There has been little
research comparing the actual failures observed in real-world systems
and those modelled using percolation theory. Therefore the validity of
these models to capture real-world behaviours can be questioned.
3. Percolation theory approach
Percolation theory was initially introduced by Cohen et al. [11] to
predict the critical percolation threshold of a single complex system. In
many of the subsequent studies, the resilience of the network has been
defined by the value of this ``critical threshold”, or by the size of the
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largest connected cluster (Bunde and Havlin [5]). Percolation theory
has previously been applied to the analysis of obtaining optimal paths
[4], immunisation [9] and the study of complex networks [36]. The
vast majority of these real-world networks were analysed as single
systems, however, in reality they are part of a complex system of sys-
tems. For example, a road network can be analysed as a single system,
but in order to function normally it requires a constant electricity
supply to power traffic lights. As such, percolation theory was extended
by Gao et al. [17] to consider interconnected, and interdependent,
networks. They provided a systematic mathematical framework for
analysing the failures occurring simultaneously in interdependent net-
works. In this modelling approach, a series of simple steps and rules are
used to determine the propagating impacts of the failure of node(s) in
one network to another connected network. Both networks are mod-
elled as a series of nodes and connecting links, however, unlike tradi-
tional network theory there are two types of link. The ``connectivity
links” connect the nodes in a single network and allow it to carry out its
own function, and the ``dependence links” which represent the de-
pendence connections between the two single networks. In essence,
nodes are considered to have ``failed” if they are no longer connected to
the largest cluster of nodes or lose their dependent connection to a node
in the other network. It is worth noting that these ``failed” nodes are
those that can no longer operate, due to the rule sets of the theory,
rather than necessarily being due to operational difficulties (e.g. they
may not be damaged requiring repair or maintenance to be under-
taken). The theory quantifies the impact of the failure of a single, or
number of, nodes in one network to the connected network and also the
potential further damage to the initial network through these cascading
failures. In their work, Gao et al. [17] applied this theory to a series of
interconnected random networks and scale-free networks.
To illustrate the theory, we apply it to two small sample infra-
structure networks, as shown in Fig. 1. These networks both consist of a
series of nodes and links and we highlight the ``source” node both
networks, which could represent a reservoir or power station, for ex-
ample. There are also two interdependent links between these networks
(D1 and D2). In this example we fail one node in Network A (node
number 2) and follow the rule set of percolation theory to show the
impact that this has to the connected Network B and also the remainder
of Network A. The ``rule-set” used in percolation theory can be sim-
plified into six main stages:
Stage 1: Fail, or remove, any links attached to the failed node in
Network A;
Stage 2: Fail any nodes, and connecting links, in Network A that are
not connected to the largest cluster of remaining nodes (these may
be isolated nodes or form a smaller cluster);
Stage 3: Fail any nodes in Network B that are dependent on a failed
node in Network A;
Stage 4: If there are failed nodes in Network B, then fail any links
attached to these nodes in Network B;
Stage 5: Fail any nodes, and connecting links, in Network B that are
not connected to the largest cluster of remaining nodes;
Stage 6: If there are any nodes in Network A that are dependent on a
failed node in Network B, fail these nodes and repeat the process
from Stage 2, until there are no further failed nodes.
From Fig. 1, it can be seen that failing node 2 in Network A
(Fig. 1(a)) causes the network to split into one cluster and three isolated
nodes, therefore, following the rules of percolation theory nodes (and
links) not connected to the largest cluster are also deemed to have failed
(Fig. 1(b)). The failed node 8 in Network A was an interconnected node
(to node 2 in Network B) and therefore the connected node in Network
B is also deemed to have failed. This results in Network B splitting into
two clusters of nodes, one formed of four nodes and the other five.
Again following the rules of percolation theory, nodes not connected to
the largest cluster of nodes are also deemed to have failed (Fig. 1(c)).
The remaining ``functioning” parts of the two networks are shown in
Fig. 1(d).
Percolation theory provides a computationally efficient metho-
dology for assessing the impacts of nodal (or link) failure in inter-
dependent, or dependent, networks. However, whilst this theory has
merit in certain applications, the authors argue that it is not a suitable
methodology for analysing the risk of failures within infrastructure
systems. This is partly due to the failure of the methodology to re-
cognise the flow of resource in many of these networks, which can be
uni-directional, and their ``hierarchical” structure. However, it is the
lack of consideration of the location of the ``source” node(s) which
could be considered the main failing of this methodology. This omission
may result in the largest cluster of nodes not including a source node, as
such, this cluster cannot be considered ``functioning” after the hazard
event (i.e. node removal) as it has no access to resource. For example, in
the case of an electrical network a community cannot be considered
``functional” if it is not ultimately connected to a power station/source.
In the example shown in Fig. 1, it can be seen that the cluster of nodes
that survives in Network B does not have a connection to a source node,
therefore it cannot provide the communities with a quantity of service,
nor can it maintain Network A (as there are no interconnections re-
maining). As such, no nodes in Network B can be considered ``func-
tioning” and only a small number of nodes in Network A remain.
However, it could be argued that in Network B, nodes 5–9 should be
considered to have ``failed” and nodes 1, 3 and 4, which were failed by
percolation theory should remain functional. These nodes were failed as
they were not part of the largest cluster in Network B, but they are
connected to the source node. Therefore, considering the performance
of infrastructure systems there is no cause as to why these nodes cannot
remain in the network.
If the function of infrastructure is to transmit a quantity of ``re-
source” from where it is available (either stored or produced) to where
it is needed, then it is logical to model them in these terms. There are
two factors which determine the network's ability to achieve this
function:
i The existence of a connection between supplier and recipient.
ii The ability of this connection to deliver what the recipient needs.
Topological networks and percolation theory address the former,
but the omission of the latter means they are not realistic enough to
meet the requirements of infrastructure providers. However, if we
capture information regarding node supply (e.g. which nodes are con-
nected to a supply node – either directly or indirectly) and define some
physical limits of the network, we are able to apply computationally
efficient methodologies and capture both factors. We can also specify
some simplified heuristics which allow us to circumnavigate data
availability issues.
4. Hierarchal theory approach
In this paper, we propose a new methodology for analysing inter-
dependent, or dependent, infrastructure systems based on the percola-
tion theory approach – namely, a hierarchical methodology. We make a
number of changes to the percolation theory ``ruleset” to acknowledge
the location of the ``source” node in the analysis, which determines the
nodes that have access to, at least some, quantity of resource. We also
do not remove any nodes that not connected to the largest cluster in the
network, but rather remove nodes if they become disconnected with a
``source” node(s). If appropriate, the idea of flow direction is also in-
cluded in this approach and is achieved by assigning each node an
``upstream” node(s) and, where appropriate, a ``downstream” node(s).
We achieve this in the model by considering the real-world infra-
structure system, its topology and flow directions. For example, in the
case of an electrical network (Fig. 2) the Distribution Substations are
dependent upon the Primary Substations in order to supply a quantity
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of electricity. Primary Substations will supply many Distribution Sub-
stations, not just one; therefore, if a Primary Substation fails, then so do
all the Distribution Substations attached to it. Subsequently, if a Bulk
Supply Point fails, so do the connected Primary Substations (unless they
have a connection to another Bulk Supply Point) and their connected
Distribution Substations. This uni-directional flow is not apparent in all
infrastructure systems, for example the vast majority of roads in a road
traffic network can be navigated in both directions.
Fig. 3 shows the same two networks, as in Fig. 1 and we fail the
same node in Network A (namely, node number 2) to assess the cas-
cading failure this causes to both networks, providing a direct com-
parison to percolation theory. The removal of node 2 in Network A
(Fig. 3(a)) again causes the failure of three other nodes in the network
(nodes 6–8) as they have ``lost” their connection to the source node
(Fig. 3(b)). With the failure of node 8, in Network A, one of the inter-
connected links has also failed, which results in the failure of node 2 in
network B. In the same manner as percolation theory, this causes the
network to split into two clusters. However, unlike percolation theory,
the largest cluster is failed in this example as it does not contain a
``supply” node – we maintain nodes that have a connection to a
``supply” node using hierarchical theory (Fig. 3(c)). The resulting net-
works can be seen in Fig. 3(d) and are clearly different to those cal-
culated using percolation theory (Fig. 1(d)).
Using Hierarchical Theory the ``surviving” nodes in both Network A
and Network B are all connected to a source node and are able to access
some quantity of service. These two networks are also still connected
via the interdependent link, D1. The cause of this difference is essen-
tially the change in the rule which removes nodes if they are not part of
the largest cluster (percolation theory) to the removal of nodes if they
do not have a connected to an ``upstream” node or if the cluster does
not contain a ``source” node (Hierarchical methodology). In a similar
manner to percolation theory, the ``rulesets” for the hierarchical
methodology can be simplified into six main stages:
Stage 1: Fail, or remove, any links attached to the failed node in
Network A;
Stage 2: Fail any ``downstream” nodes, and connecting links, in
Network A that do not have an ``upstream” connection;
Stage 3: Fail any nodes in Network B that are dependent on a failed
node in Network A;
Stage 4: If there are failed nodes in Network B, then fail any links
attached to these nodes in Network B;
Stage 5: Fail any ``downstream” nodes, and connecting links, in
Network B that do not have an ``upstream” connection;
Stage 6: If there are any nodes in Network A that are dependent on a
failed node in Network B, fail these nodes and repeat the process
from Stage 2, until there are no further failed nodes.
Fig. 1. An example of cascading failure in interdependent simplified infrastructure networks using a percolation theory approach. (a) Two example networks, where
the direction of flow is from the top of the diagram to the bottom. In this example there are two interdependent connections, the first (D1) between node A5 and node
B1, and the second (D2) between node A8 and node B2. The failed node, node A2, is shown in red. (b) All connecting links to node A2 are then failed, as are nodes A6,
A7 and A8 which have all become isolated (e.g. they have no remaining links connecting them to other nodes in the network). (c) The interdependent node, node A8,
is failed therefore node B2, and its connected links, also fail. The network has now broken into two clusters and therefore the smallest cluster (formed of B1, B3, B4
and the source) also fail. (d) Showing the resulting networks.
Fig. 2. Showing a typical electricity supply chain hierarchy.
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From these results, we therefore argue that the Hierarchical meth-
odology is more representative of interdependent infrastructure fail-
ures, compared to the percolation theory methodology for instances
where flow is uni-directional and a ``source” node is used in the system.
If percolation theory is applied to the analysis of interdependent in-
frastructure systems, which include a ``source” node(s) (e.g. electrical
distribution networks or gas pipeline networks), then large errors may
be present in the results which could lead to incorrect assumptions
regarding the resilience, or failure risk, of two (or more) interconnected
infrastructure systems.
5. Application to interdependent networks
We have established that the presented hierarchical methodology
can be applied to more representatively indicate interconnected infra-
structure failures compared to percolation theory. We now apply both
methodologies to the analysis of two real-world infrastructure systems,
namely an electricity network and a water network, to demonstrate the
differences in these two theories on a typical ``infrastructure scale”.
5.1. Electricity network
We obtained the topology of a UK electricity distribution network
from a ‘Long Term Development Statement’ which are published by the
regional operators. The components of this network are summarised in
Table 1. The table also displays the natural hierarchy, as discussed in
the previous section (see Fig. 2), as the high transmission voltages are
stepped down through different levels into the domestic network. For
our analysis we have converted the raw topological network into a
hierarchical, unidirectional flow graph indicating which higher order
substations could feed each lower order substations, subject to con-
nectivity and capacity constraints. To preserve the flow of this paper we
have included the detailed description of this conversion process in the
Supplementary Information and the reader is directed to Dunn et al.
[14] for a detailed process on how to create a network graph from a
real-world infrastructure system.
5.2. Water network
We have obtained the water distribution network for the same
geographical area as the electrical distribution network, to allow the
identification of dependent connections between the two systems. The
water network has been obtained from the connectivity schematics
produced by the water company, and consists of a five different types of
node, as detailed in Table 2. This network data is supported by in-
formation regarding pumping capacity prepared by the company as
part of their annual submission to the regulator (Ofwat). All nodes, with
the exception of the source nodes, require a supply of water and in a
similar manner to the electrical distribution network we need to define
a set of assumptions regarding the capacity of the network components.
Fig. 3. An example of cascading failure in interdependent networks using our developed hierarchical theory approach. (a) Two example networks, where the
direction of flow is from the top of the diagram to the bottom. In this example there are two interdependent connections, the first (D1) between node A1 and node B5,
and the second (D2) between node A2 and node B8. The failed node, node B2, is shown in red. (b) All connecting links to node B2 are then failed, as are nodes B6, B7
and B8 now do not have an “upstream” connection. (c) The interdependent node, node B8, is failed therefore node A2, and its connected links, also fail. The
“downstream” nodes A5-9 also fail as they do not have an “upstream” connection. (d) Showing the resulting networks.
Table 1
Detailing the number, and type, of substations in the case study distribution
electricity network.
Substation type Input voltage Output voltage Number in network
Grid Supply Point (GSP) 400 kV 132 kV 2
Bulk Supply Point (BSP) 132 kV 33 kV 4
Primary Substation 33 kV 11 kV/6.6 kV 16
Distribution Substation 11 kV/6.6 kV 230 v 861
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Again, to keep the paper succinct we describe these in the accom-
panying Supplementary Information.
5.3. Results of application
In this section we present the results of the percolation theory and
hierarchical theory analysis to the interdependent water and electricity
networks. To initiate a cascading failure in the networks, we selected at
random a sample of components in the electricity network to have
failed.
We tested across four scenarios. In each we selected our sample of
failed electricity nodes from the different levels of the network outlined
in Table 1, our intention being to reveal the comparative impacts of
failures at varying asset types.
To assess the impact of different combinations of substations failing
we ran multiple simulations for each scenario. In the case of the GSP
and BSP, with only a few of each, we capture all possible combinations.
For the primary and distribution substations we ran 45 and 100 simu-
lations respectively for to capture a range of results for the same
number of node failures.
In each simulation we follow both the percolation theory and
hierarchical theory rule-sets to determine;
1 The number of components in the electricity network which are
inactive (or ``failed”) as a consequence
2 The number of components in the dependent water network which
then inactive (or ``failed”) as a cascading consequence.
We address each of these in turn in the following paragraphs. First,
Fig. 4 shows the total number of inactive electricity nodes (y-axes)
depending on the number of failed electricity nodes (x-axes) and the
hierarchical rank of these failed nodes (separate panels), Second, Fig. 5
shows the total number of inactive water nodes (y-axes) depending – as
before – on number and an hierarchical rank of failed electricity sub-
stations. For ease of communication we only count the nodes affected
but this easily can be converted to a more precise measure of impact by
attributing additional information such as population served.
The results for the electricity network show stark differences be-
tween the two methodologies. The results from the hierarchical ap-
proach match what expectations in the real world. For example, if all
the grid supply points fail then every node in the electrical network
becomes inactive (Fig. 4(a)). Meanwhile there is a linear relationship
between failed distribution substations and the number of inactive
Table 2
Detailing the number, and type, of components in the case study
water network.
Component type Number in network
Sources 13
Treatment works 27
Service reservoirs 3
Pumping stations 16
Demand nodes 85
Fig. 4. Plotting the number of failed (a) the grid supply points, (b) bulk supply points, (c) primary substations and (d) distribution substations in the electricity
network against the total number of failed nodes in the same network (due to cascade effects), for both percolation theory and hierarchical theory.
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nodes because they have no dependents (Fig. 4(d)). This is not the case
in the percolation theory results. For example, failing any combination
of grid supply points or any combination of bulk supply points has the
same impact with less than a quarter of the network affected (Fig. 4(b)).
It is intuitive that this does not reflect reality because a complete failure
at either level would disconnect demand from supplies. This occurs
because, percolation theory does not take into account the flow of re-
source within a network or the ability to deliver a quantity of service, it
simply looks at the largest cluster. In this example, percolation theory
substantially overestimates the vulnerability of the electrical network to
failures at primary and distribution substations (i.e. the more numerous
and smaller) and underestimates the vulnerability to failures at grid and
bulk supply points (i.e. the fewer, more critical sites).
Fig. 5 turns our attention to the cascading impacts on the water
network. The results of the hierarchical approach meet expectations.
The failure of all connected components in the electricity network result
in all demand components in the water network becoming inactive.
Scatter in the results reflects the connectivity of infrastructure systems
as not all electricity nodes are linked to water nodes, and there is in-
ternal variability in the importance of water nodes. There is less scatter
for grid and bulk supply points because they affect a broad area
whereas variability increases at lower ranked electricity nodes because
they link more specifically to particular water nodes.
However, the results for percolation theory are not showing the
behaviour which can be expected from an infrastructure system. For
example, it suggests that some water demand components will remain
active even if we fail all components in the electricity system. As pre-
viously, these errors occur because percolation theory only considers
the largest cluster and disregards the importance of connection between
supply and demand. The effect of this in these interdependent networks
is that percolation theory underestimates the vulnerability of the water
network to electricity network failures.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented and developed a new modelling
methodology, which aims to provide infrastructure owners/operators
with a computationally efficient tool to assess the impact that third
party failures (i.e. failures within a connected system) may have to their
system, without the need for a wealth of complex input data (about
either their system or any interdependent systems).
This new approach develops upon percolation theory with a few key
changes. To reflect that infrastructure systems components cannot
continue to operate if they cannot access a supply of the relevant re-
source, we maintain the ``hierarchal” nature of networks. We determine
a node's ``upstream” and ``downstream” nodes and do not allow the
node to continue to function without connection to an ``upstream”
node. This ensures that all nodes within the network have access to at
least one ``supply” node (e.g. reservoir, power station) so they still
receive at least some quantity of service during disruption. This is in
contrast to percolation theory, which determines the state of nodes
based on their membership of the largest cluster, and does not ac-
knowledge the role of supply nodes.
We applied our hierarchical methodology and percolation theory to
analyse two connected infrastructure systems, namely a water dis-
tribution system and electrical distribution system. We failed a sample
of nodes within the electricity network and determined their impact
upon the demand nodes within the water network. Attributing the
Fig. 5. Hierarchical theory and percolation theory applied to the interconnected water and electricity networks, plotting the number of failed demand components in
the water network due to the failure of: (a) the grid supply points, (b) bulk supply points, (c) primary substations and (d) distribution substations in the electricity
network.
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number of customer served by each node would be a simple way for
infrastructure operators to translate this to customer impact. We
showed that the results of the hierarchical approach were indicative of
``real-world” systems. We also showed that in some cases percolation
theory over-estimated of the vulnerability of a network, whereas in
other cases it under-estimated. These differences are due to the perco-
lation theory approach not accounting for the location of ``supply”
nodes, nor the ability for other nodes to be connected to these. This is
important because influential, widely cited, studies using percolation
theory may be mis-representing the true resilience of critical infra-
structure networks.
It should be noted, that it has not been possible to validate the re-
sults from either approach against a physically-based model or indeed
the real-world networks themselves. The empirical data is limited by
the rarity of failures and recording of faults in disparate systems across
infrastructure providers. The best information is in individual case
studies as outlined in the introduction. The complexity and depth of
interdependency between systems makes large scale physical modelling
across multiple scenarios an intractable challenge. This reinforces the
importance of developing accurate, yet simplified, analysis tools.
To summarise, we acknowledge that our hierarchical approach
presents a ``simplified” view of a real-world infrastructure system and
therefore may not capture small scale failures within the systems nor
the system dynamics (e.g. presence of water towers that may only be
able to supply a community with service for a limited period). However,
it does provide a computationally efficient methodology for analysing
infrastructure interdependence failures, which does not require large
amounts of data and is based upon a logical rule set.
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